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Abstract 
 
Indonesia’s transition towards democracy since 1998 has been welcomed by democrats around 
the world as an important gain in a worldwide shift towards democracy.  The nation has now held 
two democratic parliamentary elections – the first in 1999 and the most recent in April 2004.  Each 
of these elections was free from violence and deemed to be free and fair by Indonesia and 
international observers.  Yet there remains significant questions about who is participates in and is 
represented by Indonesia’s new democracy.  Importantly, few women have gained access to 
political power, either within national or local parliament, despite considerable debate and the 
adoption of strategies to increase the number of women in politics.  This paper explores the 
ongoing barriers to women’s participation in parliaments in Indonesia against the backdrop the 
legacy of history – particularly New Order ideology, prevailing stereotypes and a particular 
interpretation of Islam. 
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On 21 May 1998 Indonesia’s President Suharto resigned, ending more than three 
decades of authoritarian rule known as the New Order.  During Suharto’s New Order, 
parliament existed, but exercised little decision making power.  Indeed, few beyond a 
relatively small circle of men had any share in power.  The military played a ‘dual 
role’ (dwi fungsi) that went beyond issues of national defence.  The military had an 
institutional role in politics with 75 seats within the National Parliament reserved for 
unelected military officers.  The military also played a lucrative role in the economy.  
The New Order regime placed great emphasis on national stability and economic 
growth.  The price for national stability was the imposition of a national identity on a 
country made up of peoples with different histories, languages, cultures and religions.  
Indonesian national identity, as constructed by the New Order, was homogenous and 
highly gendered.  Economic growth was the centre-piece of the New Order’s 
achievements.  Indonesia was often presented as a show case of good economic 
management.  While the benefits of economic growth were not shared equally across 
the population, there were marked improvements in the quality of life during the New 
Order period.  Education enrolment rates increased, with equal numbers of boys and 
girls enrolled in and completing primary school by the late 1980s.  Access to health 
care improved and infant mortality rates and deaths from preventable diseases fell.  
Income per capita increased. 
 
In 1997 with the onset of the Asian Economic Crisis, the two pillars of President 
Suharto’s success – national stability and economic improvement – were shattered.  
The rupiah plunged against the United States dollar and price of basic commodities 
increased dramatically.   Both white collar and factory workers faced widespread 
retrenchments.  As the nation faced economic devastation, national unity and stability 
began to fracture.  In May 1998 massive student demonstrations where held across the 
country.  On May 12 four students from Trisakti University in Jakarta were shot and 
killed by security forces.  On 13 and 14 May riots broke out in Jakarta, destroying 
large areas of the city’s business precinct.  Jakarta’s ethnic Chinese community was a 
primary target of the riots, which took on a highly gendered dimension with extreme 
sexual violence and gang rape against (primarily ethic Chinese) women.  Indonesia’s 
long awaited political transition was, as John McBeth pointed out in late 1998, 
seriously flawed (McBeth 1999: 23).  Given the particular consequences of the 
economic crises for women and the gendered violence of the May riots, the transition 
appeared especially flawed for women. 
 
                                                 
∗ An abridged version of this paper will appear in Yvonne Galligan and Manon Tremblay (eds), 
Sharing Power: Women in Parliament in Post-Industrial and Emerging Democracies, Ashgate, 
London, 2004 
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Upon Suharto’s resignation, Vice President Habibie stepped into the Presidency, in 
line with the nation’s Constitution.  General elections, announced for June 1999, were 
duly held, and widely heralded as the first free and fair elections held in Indonesia 
since 1955.1  As part of the political transition that followed the resignation of Suharto, 
the Habibie administration introduced a wide range of political reforms including new 
electoral laws and a program of radical decentralisation, which was the antithesis of 
the heavily centralised and authoritarian state of the New Order.  Within Indonesia, 
decentralisation was widely considered to be central to democratic consolidation.  It is 
also an immensely ambitious task.  The 1999 elections were held after rapid and 
extensive revision of the electoral system, whereby a complex hybrid of proportional 
representation and district quotas was agreed upon for the new elections.  Under the 
1999 regional autonomy laws, substantial responsibility for decision-making and 
service delivery – previously concentrated in the national government – will be 
devolved to district (kabupaten/kota) level.  Thus, while the focus of this chapter is on 
the national parliament, the role of district level assemblies – and the extent to which 
women share in decision-making within those arenas – will become increasingly 
important in coming years.  At the national level, the reforms undertaken following 
the resignation of Suharto gave rise to more active legislatures, with considerably 
greater scope to influence and indeed shape the political agenda than was possible 
during the New Order, when parliament was essentially the rubber stamp of the 
executive.  Significantly, the early initiatives of the legislature following the 1999 
elections sought to limit the power of the President, initially by placing two-term 
limits on the offices of both the President and Vice-President.  Subsequent 
constitutional and legislative changes strengthened parliament’s powers to monitor 
and demand accountability from the executive.  Initial steps were also taken towards 
ending the political role of the military, with the number of parliamentary seats 
reserved for military officers reduced from 75 under the New Order to 38 (just under 
eight percent) following the 1999 elections. In 2003, all reserved seats for the military 
were abolished and the Parliament became fully elected. 
 
Indonesia’s transition towards democracy in 1998 and the general elections of 1999 
were welcomed by democrats around the world as significant for several reasons.  
First, with a population of some 210 million Indonesia is one of the world’s most 
populous nations.  Second, prior to 1998 Indonesia’s leadership played an important 
role in the politics of Southeast Asia, particularly within ASEAN, and had long 
championed the Asian Values perspective that rejected the relevance of democracy 
and human rights discourses to Asia.  Political transition in Indonesia was regarded by 
many as critical to the shift away from authoritarianism in Southeast Asia and the 
emergence of a liberal wing within ASEAN.  Finally, as the world’s largest Muslim 
nation, Indonesia’s political transition provides a potential example of the 
compatibility between parliamentary democracy and Islam.   
 
                                                 
1 I observed the general elections in Tanjung Priok, a port area of north Jakarta.  The elections, in the 
small area that I observed, were free and fair – and accompanied by a carnival like atmosphere and 
great hope for the future.  Both men and women voted in large numbers.  A particularly moving image 
was a woman in her seventies being helped to the polling booth by her grandsons.  Bent over and 
struggling to support herself, she made a great effort to enter the booth alone and cast her vote.  With a 
smile she dropped her ballot into the box.  She later told me that she had waited a long time – too long 
– for this day. 
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For these reasons, Indonesia’s transition towards democracy received a great deal of 
attention from scholars, the media and donor agencies and governments.  The 
problems that accompanied transition – including deep-rooted and ongoing corruption, 
severe communal violence, and questionable leadership – and Indonesia’s bold 
experiment with decentralisation have all been the focus of detailed commentary and 
analysis.  A critical question is whether political transformation will result in the 
establishment of a parliamentary process that is both accountable to and 
representative of the people.  Throughout the nation’s independent history, parliament 
has not been genuinely representative, with the most obvious shortcoming being the 
very small numbers of women.  In exploring the question of whether transition will 
open the way to greater numbers of women in parliament, this chapter examines the 
history of exclusion and the serious obstacles that remain.    
 
History of Women’s Legislative Involvement 
The Emergence of the Women’s Movement 
The women’s movement grew markedly during the late colonial period, as nationalist 
aspirations intertwined with concern about so-called ‘women’s issues’ such as 
education for girls, child marriage and polygamy.  A primary concern of women’s 
groups was that the interests of women would be advanced in an independent 
Indonesia.  The first in a series of Indonesian Women’s Congresses was held in 1928, 
and the Federation of Indonesian Women’s Associations was formed the following 
year at the 1929 Congress.  The Federation adopted a stance of non-involvement in 
politics, but in reality issues of nationalism and the struggle for independence were 
not, and could not be, avoided.  If women’s groups were concerned to secure certain 
rights and protections for women in an independent nation, the nationalist movement 
could see the value in winning the support of the women’s groups.  In his address to 
the Third Women’s Congress in 1932, Ki Hadjar Dewantoro described to his audience 
the important contribution of women’s groups to the nationalist movements in India, 
Turkey, Persia and China (Vreeede-de-Steurs 1960: 92).  Women were urged to 
inspire patriotism in their children and their duty as mothers of the people was 
invoked (Jayawardena 1986: 151).  These images of woman-mother have since been a 
consistent theme of gender relations in Indonesia, with important implications for 
women’s political roles.  The 1930s brought the emergence of Isteri Sedar (Alert 
Women) which was openly political and nationalist.  The movement encouraged 
women to participate actively in politics.  While earlier groups had focused primarily 
on the concerns of middle class women, Isteri Sedar adopted socialist rhetoric around 
demands for improved conditions for working class women and education for the 
masses (Jayawardena 1986: 151).  In 1932, Isteri Sedar’s conference was addressed 
by a young, male nationalist leader who delivered a speech entitled ‘The Political 
Movement and the Emancipation of Women’.  The speech drew an explicit link 
between the struggle for nationalism and the struggle for women’s rights.  The 
speaker was Sukarno, who would become Indonesia’s first President. 
 
While the focus of women’s movements in the 1920s and 1930s continued to be on 
girls education, polygamy and child marriage – with some intertwining of these issues 
with nationalism – the issue of women’s franchise did feature of the agenda, often in a 
nationalist context.  For example, the 1941 proposal that Dutch women, but not 
Indonesian women, be granted municipal voting rights was met with considerable 
protest.  Indonesian women finally won the right to vote in the final years of Dutch 
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rule.  The right of women to vote and stand for election in the new independent nation 
was enshrined in the 1945 Constitution. 
 
Women and Parliament in Independent Indonesia 
Following Indonesia’s independence in 1949, women’s rights in relation to marriage – 
particularly issues of polygamy, consent, and child marriage – remained the priority 
concerns for women’s groups (see Blackburn and Bessell 1997).  Demands for a 
national marriage law dominated the agenda of many women’s groups.  As Susan 
Blackburn has argued, it is not surprising that “governments and parliaments 
dominated by men did not give this matter high priority” (1994: 171).  And indeed 
successive parliaments of independent Indonesia were heavily male dominated, and 
often indifferent to the priority concerns of women. 
 
Upon independence, Indonesia adopted a system of parliamentary democracy and 
established the Konstituante (Constitutional Assembly), which was tasked with 
providing a framework for governance in the newly independent nation.  Women 
were among the representatives who took part in the Konstituante debates of the 
1950s, and discussions included the role of women within independent Indonesia.  
While women were guaranteed certain rights and protections, these debates failed to 
provide the basis for equal opportunities for women in political life.  Early in the 
independent life of the nation, some political parties developed women’s 
organisations, such as Nahdalatul Ulama’s Muslimat, which lobbied for women to be 
put forward as parliamentary candidates.  Nevertheless, political parties failed to 
preselect women.   Other ostensibly ‘representative’ organisations – such as trade 
unions – remained male dominated, as did the leadership of religious organisations.   
Despite the linkages that had been drawn between women’s emancipation and 
political independence – not least by the male leaders of the nationalist movement – 
women did not gain anything close to an equal share in the parliament of the new 
nation. 
 
Between 1950 and 1955 only nine of the 272 members of parliament were women 
(less than four percent).  The first national election was held in 1955, with women 
turning out to vote in large numbers.  This did not, however, translate into 
significantly greater numbers of women in parliament.  Following the 1955 general 
election, the number of women increased to 17 (less than seven percent).  As 
Blackburn has noted the “lack of women is taken so much for granted that most 
commentators on Indonesian elections do not bother to mention it” (1994: 272).  
During the 1950s no women were appointed to Cabinet.  
   
By 1957 Indonesia’s party system was disintegrating and by the end of the decade the 
new nation had abandoned its short experiment with parliamentary democracy.  The 
shift away from parliamentary democracy stifled the potential for debate about the 
parliamentary representation of women (and of many other groups).  With the rise of 
the New Order under President Suharto in late 1960s, Indonesia’s shift to 
authoritarianism was consolidated.   Women were included in successive parliaments 
under the New Order regime, but the percentage remained low.  Like their male 
counterparts, female parliamentarians had limited space to advance issues beyond 
those approved by President Suharto and the ruling elite.  Debates about the rights and 
roles of women that did not accord with New Order political and gender ideology 
were explicitly excluded from the parliamentary agenda.  There was a conspicuous 
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absence of women from each of Suharto’s Cabinets until 1978.  The few women who 
were appointed to Cabinets during the 1980s and 1990s were inevitably limited to 
those ministries and responsibilities associated with women, such as social welfare 
and the role of women (see Blackburn 2001: 278). 
 
While the absence of women in successive Indonesian Parliaments and Cabinets 
gained relatively little attention, the accession in 1996 of a woman to the leadership of 
one of New Order Indonesia’s three officially sanctioned political parties attracted 
widespread comment.  As leader of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle 
(Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan, PDI-P), Megawati Sukarnoputri – 
daughter of Indonesia’s charismatic first President who presided over the transition 
away from parliamentary democracy in the late 1950s – attracted an enormous 
following and prompted widespread debate about female leadership.  Megawati’s 
popularity was, in large part, a result of the fact that she was her father’s child, which 
was of more significance for her supporters than the fact that she was her father’s 
daughter.  Among her opponents, however, her sex was seen as a political weapon to 
be used against her. 
 
In May 1998, amidst a collapsing economy, mass demonstrations against Suharto and 
the political elite, riots in several major cities and violent attacks against ethnic 
Chinese (particularly women), Suharto announced his resignation and Vice-President 
Habibie was sworn in as President.  A week after taking power, Habibie – with the 
agreement of parliament – announced that general elections should be held in mid-
1999.  On 7 June 1999 the nation held its first democratic elections in more than forty 
years.  In the weeks leading up to the election, non-government organisations ran 
campaigns to encourage women to vote, impressing on them their right to cast their 
vote as they wished, without pressure from husbands or male relatives.  On election 
day, women demonstrated an enthusiasm for the democratic process and – like men – 
turned out to vote in large numbers.  As will be discussed below, the party that won 
the largest number of votes was Megawati’s Democratic Party of Struggle;  an 
outcome that was to provoke considerable debate about female political leadership.  
Yet the percentage of women in parliament decreased from 16 percent to 8.8 percent. 
 
In addition to the National Parliament (DPR), Indonesia has the People’s Consultative 
Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR).  During the New Order, the 
MPR was the supreme political body and central to Suharto’s control of the political 
landscape, with half of the 1000 members appointed.  The MPR has undergone 
several changes since 1998.  Changes prior to the 2004 elections saw the MPR 
become fully elected, consisting of members of the DPR and members of the 
Regional Representatives Council. The MPR no longer elects the President, as was 
the case in 1999, but has responsibility for constitutional amendments and 
impeachment of the president. Over the past decade, the number of women in the 
MPR has remained consistently low.  In the period 1992–97, 60 of the then 1000 
members of the MPR were women (some six percent).  This number declined to 56 in 
the 1997-1999 period.  Following the transition towards democracy, the number of 
women in the MPR stood at fifty-nine. 
 
In October 1999, the new President – Abdurrahman Wahid – announced his Cabinet, 
which included two women.  Khofifah Indar Parawansa was appointed to the 
traditional Cabinet post for women: Minister for the Role of Women.  In a break with 
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traditional stereotypes, Erna Witoelar was appointed Minister for Housing and 
Regional Development.  Two years later, Megawati replaced Abdurrahman Wahid as 
President.  Her Cabinet of National Unity included two women:  Rini Suwandi was 
given the non-traditional portfolio of Trade and Industry, while Sri Rejeki Sumaryoto 
replaced the outspoken feminist Khofifah Indar Parawansa as Minister for Women’s 
Empowerment. 
 
Women have been politically active through Indonesia’s history, both prior to and 
since independence, yet this activity has not translated into parliamentary 
representation.  The fall of Suharto’s authoritarian New Order was not accompanied 
by greater representation of women in the nation’s parliament and the opportunities 
for women to engage in the formal processes of decision making are as limited as ever.  
Overcoming the barriers to women’s parliamentary representation presents a major 
challenge for Indonesia, but one that must be met if democratisation is to have 
substantive meaning and include that 51 percent of the population who are female.  
As the following discussion indicates the barriers are formidable. 
 
What are the Barriers 
New Order Ideology 
With Indonesia’s transition towards democracy, New Order ideology is being openly 
challenged and fundamentally revised.  Nevertheless, aspects of that ideology – 
developed and reinforced over more than three decades – remain highly influential in 
shaping social and political relations in Indonesia.  This is particularly true in regard 
to gender relations.  The image of the domesticated woman – central to New Order 
ideology if not to the reality of most women – remains strong and is a major barrier to 
women gaining an equal share of political power. 
 
The New Order state was highly gendered, as were the roles promoted by the state as 
acceptable.  As I have argued elsewhere, the construction of ‘ideal types’ was central 
to New Order ideology and control (Bessell 1998).  Within these constructions, 
citizens, families, children and, particularly, women were allocated specific roles and 
attributes. While women were not formally excluded from political life or 
parliamentary representation, the dominant ideology militated against it.  Moreover, 
while the 1945 Constitution guarantees women’s right to vote, it does not contain 
provisions on gender equality or non-discrimination in political representation 
(Katyasungkana 2000: 262).  Indeed, it would have been somewhat extraordinary for 
a document adopted more than five decades ago – in Indonesia or anywhere else in 
the world – to have addressed such issues.   
 
Julia Suryakusuma has argued that during the New Order period, Indonesian social 
organisation and relationships were infused with paternalism, with President Suharto 
portrayed as the father of the nation.  Suryakusuma also argues that strong paternalist 
strains in Javanese political culture – which are characterised by deference to power 
and authority – coincided with military norms of hierarchy and obedience to 
command (Suryakusuma 1996: 92-102).  These highly gendered characteristics were 
translated into key features of the New Order State.  The concept of azas 
kekeluargaan – or the family principle – was central to New Order philosophy, with 
the state itself conceptualised as a family.  The Department of Information’s Official 
Indonesian Handbook stated that  
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The family is the smallest unit of the nation….The state can 
only be strong if it is made up of strong families.  A just 
nation can only be achieved through a just arrangement of 
families.  For that reason, building a family implies 
participation in the building of the foundation of a nation 
(quoted in Suryakusuma 1996: 97). 
 
If building families was to be central to building the nation, then it was necessary to 
build the right kind of family.  This meant extending state control into the family.  
Within the carefully structured official power hierarchies of the New Order, the 
family was the smallest administrative unit.  Families held an identify card (kartu 
keluarga) and were grouped together into neighbourhood associations.  Several 
neighbourhood associations formed the next level of administrative unit and so on up 
the hierarchy.  Of course the extent to which people actually felt this quite pervasive 
web of state control in their everyday lives was widely variable.  But this structure 
does clearly reveal the way in which the family – and women’s roles within it – was 
utilised by the State.  This was most effectively done in the case of civil servants.  In 
New Order Indonesia , civil servants were not permitted to join political parties but 
were required to belong to the civil service organisation known as Korpri.  
Significantly, not only civil servants, but also their spouses – generally wives – were 
subject to state control.  The wives of civil servants were required to join Dharma 
Wanita – the association of wives of civil servants – as a means of supporting their 
husbands in their service of the nation.   
 
It is interesting to note that in the early 1980s about 25% of civil servants were 
women, by the end of the New Order figure was around 38%.  These women tend to 
be concentrated in the lower levels of the service (in the late 1990s only about 16% of 
executive level positions are filled by women) (Oey Gardiner 2002: 108).  But overall 
their numbers were significant.  Nevertheless, the concept of Dharma Wanita was 
based on the assumption that the civil service is male dominated.  Female civil 
servants were automatically members of Korpri but also had the option of joining 
Dharma Wanita.  For Suryakusuma, Dharma Wanita was the embodiment of the idea 
of women as appendages of their husbands and an ideology that defined female 
dependency as ideal (Suryakusuma 1996: 98).  Indonesia’s New Order is not unique 
in the formal association of power and authority with male characteristics, and 
obedience and deference as female traits.  In New Order Indonesia, however, the 
regime actively sought to depict the state in gendered terms and harnessed 
constructions of gender as a means of state control.   
 
The depoliticisation of the women’s movement was one aspect of the New Order’s 
overall strategy of social and political control.  The mass-based organisation, the 
Family Guidance Welfare Movement or PKK (Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga) 
was central to this strategy.  Apart from religious groups, the PKK was the only mass 
organisation that village women were permitted to join. PKK had a central role to 
play in promoting and implementing official development plans at the local level and 
sought to harness women’s support for the national development agenda.  The state 
also exerted considerable control over Kowani (the Federation of Women’s 
Organisations), the official umbrella body of women’s organisations, of which 
Dharma Wanita is a member.  Rather than representing women’s interests, Kowani 
has been criticised (most vehemently by Indonesian women activists) as contributing 
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to the domestication of women and excluding them from the public sphere (see Sadli 
2002: 83).   
 
Through the activities of Kowani, Dharma Wanita and PKK, and the policies and 
rhetoric of the New Order regime, women were constructed first and foremost as 
mothers and secondly as instruments for national development.  Law number 5 of 
1974 defined the relationship between the women’s movement and the state, 
allocating five roles to women: (i) wife;  (ii) household manager;  (iii) child bearer;  
(iv) educator;  (v) citizen (Nadia 1996: 240).  It is somewhat ironic that while this law 
severely curtailed women’s public and political roles, Law number 4 of the same year 
provided women’s groups with what they had demanded for so long: a national 
marriage code, providing some protections to women in relation to marriage – 
particularly polygamy, consent and age of marriage.  While some of the rights and 
protections to which women were entitled within marriage and the domestic sphere 
were now codified, their scope to act outside of that sphere had been curtailed in law.  
 
Julia Suryakusuma has dubbed the New Order’s construction of the role of women 
‘State Ibuism’.  The term Ibu literally means mother, but is also used in a variety of 
contexts including as a respectful form of address for women.  Suryakusuma argues 
that the New Order State co-opted the term and used it in a very narrow way that 
emphasised the biological meaning (Suryakusuma 1996: 101).  Thus the New Order 
state sought to present motherhood as the primary, predetermined and natural role for 
women. 
 
Within New Order ideology, there was little scope for the ideal woman to enter the 
masculine world of politics, parliament and formal decision-making.  In her study of 
an urban community in Java, Norma Sullivan has noted that despite New Order 
ideology and rhetoric women did engage in politics at the community level and often 
exerted considerable power.  Sullivan argues, however, that “the decisions women 
make in this female dominated realm do not have the same consequences for others as 
do decisions made in the mainstream of public affairs which is characterised…by 
male dominance” (1994: 114).  Given the ideological constructs imposed by the New 
Order it is not surprising that few women entered the national parliament, and even 
fewer gained a place in Cabinets.  While the constructs of the New Order are now 
being challenged and often cast aside, their legacy – particularly in relation to the 
politics of gender – remains influential.  Ibusim is likely to remain a barrier to the 
representation of women in the national (and local) parliaments for many years to 
come. 
 
Religion 
While New Order ideology remains a barrier to women’s parliamentary representation 
in the post-New Order era, additional barriers are evident.  One potential obstacle 
opposition to women’s parliamentary representation, and more precisely women’s 
political leadership, on religious (Islamic) grounds.  The position of women within 
Islam has long been the topic of debate.  These debates are often complex and 
nuanced, weaving together the teachings of the Prophet, interpretations of religious 
jurisprudence and local custom.  At the simplest level, there is stark contrast between 
those who see a sex-based hierarchy as inherent, legitimate and divined by God and 
those who emphasise the egalitarian nature of Islam.  The latter group argue that 
inequality between men and women are shaped not so much by Islam as by particular 
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social, cultural or political contexts (see Platzdasch 2000 for an excellent overview of 
the issues).   
 
In Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim country, the possibility of a female 
president saw these debates erupt with great vigour and passion.  In the wake of the 
1999 general elections, debates were no longer theoretical and the possibility that the 
country would have a female leader was very real.  Megawati Sukarnoputri’s 
Democratic Party of Struggle had won the largest number of votes and held 153 – or 
35 percent – of the 462 seats contested.  Given her leadership of the party and her 
substantial personal following, Megawati had a strong claim to the presidency.  Under 
the 1945 Constitution the President is elected by the then 700-member People’s 
Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR).  As noted above, 
the MPR – like the Parliament itself – is a heavily male dominated institution.  The 
MPR met in October 1999, some four months after the general election, allowing 
ample time for speculation and debate about the presidency.  Much of this debate 
played out in an ostensibly Islamic context.     
 
The deep divisions among Islamic scholars and Muslims on what Islam defines as the 
appropriate ‘place’ for women and, more specifically, on the legitimacy of women 
taking up positions of political leadership, came to the fore.  Bernard Platzdasch has 
succinctly captured the debate as follows: 
On the question of women and political leadership, there is 
a general lack of clarity.  There is no statement in the 
Islamic tradition to prohibit a woman from becoming a 
rajah, caliph, sultan or president.  But neither is this 
explicitly permitted. (Platzdacsh, p 341). 
 
In February 1999 the kiai (Muslim scholars) of Nadatul Ulama, Indonesia’s largest 
Muslim organisation, declared that a female president would be acceptable to the 
umat (Muslim community).  This did not, however, end the debates – largely because 
they were fuelled not only by varying interpretations of religious doctrine, but also by 
political self-interest.  The month after the declaration of the kiai, Abdurrahman 
Wahid argued that a woman president would be unacceptable to the majority of 
Muslims (McIntyre 2001: 94).  As a potential presidential candidate, Abdurrahman 
Wahid’s objection to women in positions of national leadership must be understood in 
the context of a political power struggle.   Another political leader, Hamzah Haz also 
expressed strong opposition to the idea of a female president in 1999, declaring that it 
would be contrary to Islamic teaching.  As leader of the Muslim United Development 
Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunanm, PPP), Hamzah had a strong stake, not only in 
not only in Islamic teachings but also – perhaps more so – in a far more secular world 
of politics.  In the lead-up to the MPR sitting, Amien Rais (leader of the National 
Mandate Party – Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN – and speaker of the MPR), Hamzah 
Haz and other leading Muslim politicians formed the so-called central axis (poros 
tengah).  This was an alliance of Muslim parties, designed to capture the majority of 
votes within the MPR and ensure that Muslim parties maintained a strong stake in 
power.  The agreed candidate of the central axis was Abdurrahman Wahid, who was 
duly elected to the presidency (see Bourchier 2000: 23).  Megawati’s claim to the 
presidency had been overcome, and her sex was a useful weapon in the campaign to 
keep her out of the presidential palace.  As president, Abdurrahman Wahid was able 
to overcome his misgivings about female leaders sufficient to appoint Megawati to the 
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position of vice president.  By 2001, Hamzah Haz also appeared to have overcome his 
aversion to a female president, as he accepted the Vice Presidency under President 
Megawati. 
 
 Prevailing Stereotypes and Ideology 
While some opposition to the possibility of a female president was based on various 
interpretations of religious principles, the ensuing debates suggested that prevailing 
stereotypes, about not only the role but also the ‘nature’ of women, act as an implicit 
barrier to the political representation of women.  Such stereotypes pre-existed 
Suharto’s accession to power, but reinforced and were reinforced by New Order 
ideology, which sought to harness gender stereotypes for political ends.  The New 
Order construction of women drew on particular aspects of Islamic and Javanese 
traditions the define women’s roles as limited to the domestic or private sphere and 
secondary to those of men.  At the same time, traditions whereby women acted in 
public roles were studiously excluded from the official discourse.  Barbara Hatley has 
suggested that the influence of patriarchal Hindu ideology, which slowly spread 
across Southeast Asia from the second and third centuries AD, resulted in the 
emergence of “polarised images of dependent, devoted wife and wild 
temptress/widow-witch” (Hatley 2002: 132).  These images are captured by the verses 
of the Ramayana that suggest “when women are independent it will bring curses” and 
traditional Javanese proverbs such as “Swargo nunut, neroko katut” (to heaven by 
your leave; to hell by your command) (quoted in Democratization in Indonesia: An 
Assessment 2000: 178.).  There is little scope for women to be cast as autonomous 
political actors within such stereotypes, which provided fertile ideological soil in 
which the New Order could plant its own gender ideology of ‘State Ibuism’.  Aspects 
of traditional belief systems, Islam and New Order ideology – which are contradictory 
on many issues – have all served to construct an ideal of womanhood that is centred 
on notions of wife and mother.  Woman as political leader and decision-maker outside 
the realm of the household does not sit easily with this ideal. 
 
In the debates about a female president, there was considerable focus on Megawati 
herself, who was considered by many to be a housewife who was uneducated, 
unprepared and unfit for national leadership.  As debates around Megawati’s possible 
presidency raged, the tension between the privately important role wife and mother 
who manages the household and the seriously important public role of political leader 
were clearly demonstrated.  It should be noted that there were serious question marks 
over Megawati’s credentials as a potential national leader and policy maker.  Of 
course, similar question marks have hung over many other (male) political leaders and 
would-be leaders.  The difference was the highly gendered nature of the debates 
around Megawati’s potential ascendancy, and the way in which her sex and the 
imagery of the housewife became central.  No longer was the image of the housewife 
one that evoked respect;  in the context of political leadership, housewife appeared to 
become a term of derision.  Krishna Sen has suggested that while there may have been 
general opposition to the notion of a woman as president, there was particular 
opposition to this woman (Sen 2002: 15).  But underlying the debate was a more 
general theme about what public roles were appropriate for women.  Regular use of 
the term ‘housewife’ to describe Megawati, and an apparent fascination with her attire 
and handbag, permeated media reports and political commentary – both within and 
beyond Indonesia.  While the opposition to Megawati as President was, in part, 
opposition to her personally, the debates raised profound questions regarding the 
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potential to significantly increase the numerical and substantive representation of 
women within Indonesia’s fledgling democratic parliament.   
 
 
Strategies to Increase Women’s Parliamentary Representation 
During the New Order, strategies to increase the parliamentary representation of 
women were extremely limited.  The disappointingly, but not unexpectedly, low 
number of women elected to parliament in the 1999 general election focused the 
attention of those supporting greater parliamentary representation of women on how 
that objective might be achieved.  Many women’s groups, which had previously given 
comparatively little attention to women’s political rights, have taken up the challenge.  
These groups have found an ally within policy making circles in the form of the 
Ministry for Women’s Empowerment.  Formally called the Ministry for the Role of 
Women, and charged with implementing the New Order’s gender policies, the 
Ministry has now emerged as a champion of women’s rights and gender equity.  
 
The Role of Women’s Groups 
Despite the relatively few women who have entered Indonesia’s National Parliament, 
the considerable barriers to women’s parliamentary representation, and official 
ideology that seeks to define women’s roles in the private sphere, women have been 
important within the broad political scene in Indonesia.  Throughout the New Order, 
women’s groups were significant political actors – either as state sponsored advocates 
of official policy or as critics and opponents of the repressive regime.  In early 1998, 
as the economic crisis worsened, a group of largely middle-class women calling 
themselves Suara Ibu Penduli (Voice of Concerned Mothers) launched a protest at a 
busy intersection in central Jakarta.  Describing themselves as housewives, the group 
protested against the spiralling commodity prices, arguing that it was impossible for 
women to fulfill their roles as wives and mothers when unable to afford to buy food 
for their families and milk for their children.  The arrest of three of the group’s leaders 
drew considerable media attention in Indonesia and raised the profile of the groups.  
Suara Ibu Penduli serves as an example of what might be described ‘politicised 
motherhood’ – whereby these women sought to co-opt the role accorded to them by 
the regime to make a strong political statement.  The likely impact of this politicised 
motherhood is somewhat ambivalent.  On the one hand, these women are 
demonstrating their preparedness and capacity to engage in and influence the political 
life of the nation – albeit from outside the formal corridors of power.  They are also 
showing the ways in which stereotypes can be subverted and used as a point of 
resistance.  On the other hand, it could be argued that politicised motherhood 
reinforces the stereotype that women only engage in the public, masculine world of 
politics when their ‘natural’ roles of wife and mother is under threat.  This is the very 
stereotype that acts to exclude women from parliament or, when a handful of women 
gain access, restricts them to the feminine portfolios. 
 
In post-Suharto Indonesia, both women’s organisations and individual women have 
staked a political claim – albeit largely outside the formal decision-making arena.  As 
Oey-Gardiner has pointed out, several of Indonesia’s largest and most influential non-
government organisations – including the Centre for Electoral Reform;  the 
International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development; the Urban Poor Consortium; 
and the Environmental Forum – are headed by women (2002: 111).    
 
 12
Non-government organisations provide an avenue through which women can engage 
in the politics of the nation, and in the post-New Order these groups have far greater 
space in which to operate.  The political transition and the debates around the 
possibility of a woman president has alerted some non-government organisations – 
particularly women’s organisations – to the need to confront the relative absence of 
women from formal decision-making processes.  As Susan Blackburn has noted, 
women’s organisations entered the debate on the merits of a female president rather 
late.  However, by 2001 the issue of women’s political representation had gained 
momentum (Blackburn 2001: 278-79) and strategies to improve what is considered an 
unacceptable and undemocratic situation are being actively explored and debated. 
 
Quotas, Women’s Caucuses and Electoral Reform 
Gender quotas, women’s caucuses within parliament and electoral reform have all 
been raised as possible strategies to increase women’s parliamentary representation.  
The Ministry for Women’s Empowerment has identified its role in post-Suharto 
Indonesia as achieving “more equitable treatment for women in the family, society 
and nation” (Parawansa 2002: 73).  To this end, the Ministry has stated the need to 
increase women’s involvement in decision-making processes, both within parliament 
and the bureaucracy.  The Ministry supports a quota of thirty percent for women in 
parliaments – as well as at the senior levels of the civil service – as one strategy for 
achieving this.   
 
The notion of adopting quotas received support from a broad constituency, including 
parliamentarians, senior officials, non-government organisations, labour unions and 
activists.  In April 2001, advocates of women’s political rights came together at a 
workshop hosted by the Centre for Electoral Reform, the Indonesian Women’s 
Political Caucus, the Indonesian Women’s Coalition for Justice and Democracy and 
the Indonesian Centre for Women in Politics.  The workshop, held in Jakarta, was part 
of the Asia Pacific 50–50 campaign, which aims to achieve thirty percent 
representation of women in parliaments, cabinets and local decision making bodies by 
2003 and equal representation by 2005.  The participants at the Jakarta workshop 
agreed that quotas are a necessary strategy if the number of women in national, 
provincial and district legislatures is to increase.  Debate focused not on the necessity 
of quotas, but on the percentage required and the form that quotas might take (Report 
of the Jakarta Workshop of the Asia Pacific 50/50 Campaign).  There was no 
consensus on whether quotas should be ‘gender neutral’, preventing either men or 
women holding (or contesting) less than a stated percent of seats, or whether it would 
be preferable to simply set a minimum requirement for women.  There was also 
debate as to whether quotas should apply to parliament or to pre-selection for 
winnable seats.  There was agreement, however, that political parties should be 
lobbied to support a quota system.  The Ministry for Women’s Empowerment 
reconfirmed its support for quotas. 
 
The notion of quotas remained contentious, but support was building.In Indonesia, 
one of the most influential opponents of a quota system was herself a women – 
President Megawati Sukarnoputri.  Megawati argued that quotas are 
counterproductive and undermine the dignity of women;  any advancement secured as 
a result of quotas would be neither genuine nor sustainable.  Instead the President, 
who came to power in no small part as a result of her family pedigree, argued that 
accession to political office must be based on merit alone (see Jakarta Post, 2 March 
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2002).  Despite the controversy, some parties moved to adopt at least a rhetorical 
commitment to quotas.  Interestingly, one of these is Megawati’s Democratic Party of 
Struggle, which has a standing order requiring one women be represented for every 
five men on local executive boards. 
 
In 2003 advocates of quotas won a significant victory.  The 2003 electoral reform bill 
mandated that women must make up thirty percent of candidates for the 2004 
parliamentary elections.  The reform does not go so far as some would have liked.  
Importantly, the quota applies to candidates, not to seats – or even winnable seats.  
Nevertheless it was hailed by Indonesian activists and some international 
organisations as an important step forward. 
 
While the question of quotas provoked particular debate, it is only one strategy 
promoted by advocates for greater representation of women in parliament.  In addition 
to supporting quotas, the Ministry for the Empowerment of Women has promoted the 
development of networks between women engaged in party politics – both within 
parliament and beyond (Parawansa 2002: 76).  The Indonesian Women’s Political 
Caucus – one of the co-organisers of the Jakarta workshop on women’s political 
participation – now operates across party lines, with some 200 members from 
seventeen parties.  The agreed need to increase the number of female candidates and 
the number of women in parliament galvanises women of very different political, 
religious and ideological persuasions.  
 
A third potential strategy that has received limited attention to date is the need to 
make the electoral system more ‘woman friendly’.  Advocates of greater 
parliamentary representation for women have pointed out that experience elsewhere 
around the world shows that proportional representation and mixed systems are more 
likely to produce parliaments with a better gender balance.   During the revision of 
electoral laws in 2002 and early 2003, debates about the relative merits of electoral 
systems raged, this included discussion of open- versus closed-list proportional 
representation. These debates focused on the implications for political parties, with 
concern for gender equity largely relegated to women’s groups. 
 
The 2004 Elections 
Indonesia’s second democratic parliamentary elections were held in April 2004. This 
was a little more than twelve months after the adoption of the requirement that 30 
percent of candidates be women. The 2004 elections saw an increase in the number of 
women elected to the DPR – but the increase was small. In 1999, 43 women had won 
seats, meaning that women made up just under nine percent of the parliament. In 2004, 
that figure increased to just 11.1 percent, with 61 women elected. Only 12 sitting 
female candidates were re-elected. No party achieved 30 percent representation of 
women in the parliament. This result suggests that a quota for candidates is not a 
sufficient tool to redress the barriers to women’s parliamentary representation in 
Indonesia. 2004 also brought Indonesia’s first direct Presidential election. In that 
contest, Megawati lost office to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. In the lead-up to that 
election debates about female political leadership were not as prominent as in 1998-99. 
President Megawati’s defeat can be attributed to her political performance, rather than 
to her sex. 
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Democracy and Decentralisation: Opening Opportunities or Closing Doors? 
In her study of the consequences of political liberalisation on women in Jordan, 
Tunisia and Morocco, Laurie Brand concludes that “shock transitions appear to offer 
the greatest opportunities and the most serious challenges to women” (Brand 1998: 
256).  In Indonesia, the onset of the economic crisis and the fall of Suharto represent a 
severe “shock transition”, and indeed there are both new opportunities and enormous 
barriers to women’s parliamentary representation in the new political environment.  
Opportunities arise from new freedoms of expression and association, a free media 
and international support for a transition to democracy.  But, as discussed earlier, 
barriers of sizeable magnitude remain.  These barriers are reinforced by the nature of 
party politics in post-New Order Indonesia and by the decentralisation that has 
accompanied democratisation. 
  
A striking feature of Indonesia’s political transition is the proliferation of political 
parties.  During the New Order period, only three political parties were officially 
recognised and permitted to contest elections.  In contrast, 48 parties fielded 
candidates in the 1999 general election.  The 1999 Law on Political Parties identifies 
three roles that are expected of parties.  First, to provide political education to enhance 
people’s awareness of their political rights and obligations.  Second, to promote and 
champion community interests in policy through deliberative bodies;  and third, to 
prepare community members to fill political positions in accordance with democratic 
principles and institutions (Fealy 2001: 99).  This gives parties considerable 
responsibility to foster and ensure popular participation in the processes of democracy.  
Such a responsibility should include fostering and ensuring the participation of both 
women and men in the political processes – and guaranteeing women’s access to 
party membership, pre-selection on equal terms and opportunity to enter parliament.  
To date, few parties have risen to the challenge of ensuring these opportunities for 
women. 
 
Political parties in Indonesia, while often having a women’s branch, are for the most 
part heavily male dominated and highly patriarchal in structure.  Even when women 
reach positions of authority within party structures, they tend to be excluded from the 
informal power structures where ‘real’ decisions are made.  The reluctance of political 
parties to take up issues of gender equity in any serious way acts as a significant 
barrier to women’s parliamentary representation.  Perhaps more importantly, the 
prevailing attitudes within the majority of political parties prevent women from 
substantially influencing their policy agenda. 
 
Indonesia’s political transition has been accompanied by a program of far-reaching 
decentralisation.  The highly centralised nature of Suharto’s New Order is seen as 
antithetical to democracy and participation.Consequently, decentralisation is widely 
considered to be critical to democratisation. 
 
Is it possible that the process of decentralistion and the devolution of substantial 
powers to local parliaments will create space for women to enter local parliaments in 
greater numbers?  It has been suggested that there is greater opportunity for women to 
enter local level parliament, where higher levels of education, literacy and ‘political 
knowledge’ are arguably less important than at national level.  India provides an 
example of relative success in increasing the numbers of women in local parliaments 
(see Jain).  Yet in India, where a democratic system was adopted upon independence, 
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it took several decades, legislative intervention in the form of quotas, and resolute 
determination on the part of female candidates for the number of women to increase 
significantly (see Jain).  In Indonesia, an early assessment provides little optimism 
that decentralisation will increase women’s representation in local parliament, at least 
in the short to medium term.   As discussed earlier, the1999 general elections included 
elections for parliaments at provincial and district (kabupaten/kota) levels.  As at 
national level, women fared particularly poorly in the local elections, with the absence 
of women particularly noteworthy at the highest levels of decision making.  Only one 
of the thirty provincial parliaments is chaired by a woman (approximately three 
percent), while a mere six of the 245 regency parliaments are chaired by a woman 
(around two percent) (Oey Gardiner 2002: 106).   
 
Resistance to women’s parliamentary representation is – in some areas – stronger at 
local level than at national level.  While New Order ideology, some interpretations of 
Islam and prevailing stereotypes continue to obstruct greater parliamentary 
representation of women, there is nevertheless some rhetorical commitment to 
promoting opportunities for women to enter politics at the national level.  In part this 
commitment responds to the rhetoric of donor agencies (including bilateral donors 
who themselves have a rather poor record in terms of women’s parliamentary 
representation) which demands attention be paid to this issue.  The Indonesian 
government ratified the United Nations Convention on the Political Rights of Women 
in 1968 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women in 1984.   The extent to which these commitments were translated 
into practice is open to question – particularly in regard to women’s political 
representation.  Nevertheless, these instruments provide a potentially important source 
of pressure for reform, both from within Indonesia and from outside.  Yet if the 
national government failed to act to advance women’s equal access to the 
parliamentary processes, it is likely that local governments will be even less active.  
Early indications suggest that decentralisation will result in a diminishing 
commitment in many districts to an international discourse that advocates equal 
access to political representation. 
 
Laurie Brand has argued that in periods of political liberalisation, “political and social 
conservatives of various stripes – and in some cases even so-called 
progressives…construct similar programs for women when given free rein and voice: 
glorification of motherhood, promotion of women as repositories of family honor and 
societal values, the retreat of women from the work place, restriction to various forms 
of public space….” (Brand 1998: 263).  In Indonesia, such developments appear to be 
particularly problematic in some local areas and have serious implications for 
women’s representation in local (and national) parliaments – and indeed for all 
aspects of women’s lives.  Edriana Noerdin has argued that the opportunity for the 
formation of village councils and customary institutions, provided under the Law 
Number 22/1999 on decentralisation, is likely to be deleterious for women because 
there is no accompanying regulation to “prevent the revitalisation of feudal and 
patriarchal values embedded in many of these customary institutions” (Noerdin 2002: 
182).  Noerdin identifies the Nagari system of West Sumatra, which excludes women 
from the formal decision making processes by restricting participation to (male) clan 
chiefs (2002: 182), and the revival of syariah law in some areas, as examples of 
reemerging structural barriers to women’s representation in local and regional 
decision making bodies.  Noerdin also points to the disturbing example of Regional 
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Regulation Number 5/2000 adopted by the local parliament of Jakarta, which is 
antithetical to both democracy and gender equality.  This regulation states that only 
the head of the family can be a member of the village council, thus severely limiting 
the extent to which councils can be representative.  When taken in tandem with the 
1974 Marriage Law, which states that the man is the head of the family, this 
Regulation can be seen as explicitly excluding women from the formal decision 
making process (see Noerdin 2002: 185) 
 
 
Do Women ‘Make a Difference’? 
The question of whether women parliamentarians can make a difference in post-
Suharto Indonesia is an open question.  Any collective influence of women, in terms 
of progressing particular issues or impacting on the culture of the institution, is 
necessarily limited by their small numbers and the ongoing barriers to greater 
representation.   Democratisation will not necessarily be accompanied by greater 
representation of women in parliament.  The accession to power of a female president 
sent a clear signal that women can engage in political decision making at the highest 
level.  Yet Megawati herself demonstrated no enthusiasm for a feminist agenda.   
 
While Indonesia’s history over the past century is characterised by the absence of 
women from the parliamentary life of the nation, recent examples show that 
individual women are able to make a substantial difference to policy.  Since the fall of 
Suharto there have been substantial changes to policy at the national level that have 
practical and symbolic significance for gender equity.  Prior to 1999, the Indonesian 
Government adopted aspects of the international agenda for women, for example the 
Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women was 
ratified and the government committed itself to the principles of various international 
conferences including the Beijing Platform for Action.  Yet commitment remained 
shallow and was overshadowed by the essentially patriarchal ideology of the regime.  
Political transition has brought potential threats to gender equality, but has also 
resulted in notable advances for women.   
 
As noted earlier, the Ministry for the Role of Women changed its name to the State 
Ministry for the Empowerment of Women in 1999.  Susan Blackburn has suggested 
that the change went far beyond the name.  According to Blackburn, “[I]t marked the 
end of women’s affairs being seen as issues restricted to wives and mothers; the 
approach is now to tackle the construction of gender in Indonesian society that limits 
women’s rights to equity and equality” (2002: 78).  Significantly, the Ministry began 
to agitate for greater parliamentary representation of women, supporting women’s 
political networks and the establishment of women’s caucuses at national and 
provincial level, and advocating the introduction of quotas (see Parawansa 2002: 76).  
The Ministry has played a crucial role in seeking to transform the role of the state 
sponsored women’s organisations of the New Order period from perpetuators of the 
status quo into forces for women’s empowerment.  The New Order’s ‘Women in 
Development Management Teams’, designed to coordinate the government’s 
women’s programs and promote women’s role in contributing to national 
development, became ‘Women’s Empowerment Teams’.  In a similar vein, the 
Ministry has proposed that the 1974 Marriage Law be amended to redefine women’s 
roles beyond the domestic sphere (see Parawansa 2002: 76-77).  One of the most 
notable proposals put forward by the Ministry is the suggestion that young women 
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who become pregnant should be permitted to continue with their studies, given that 
education will be crucial to their ability to support themselves and their babies in the 
future.  There is deep division on the issue and debate has been considerable.  That the 
debate can occur at all, let alone be driven by a State Ministry, is a sign of remarkable 
change.  Such ideas would have been both anathema and threat to the family and 
gender ideology of the New Order. 
 
The National Plan of Action for Women (2000-2004) was a result of collaboration 
between the Ministry and a range of political, religious and community organisations.  
The Plan identifies five key areas for action: 
1. Improving women’s equality of life; 
2. Raising awareness of justice and equity issues across the nation; 
3. Eliminating violence against women; 
4. Protecting the human rights of women; and 
5. Strengthening women’s institution (including increasing women’s 
parliamentary representation). 
 
The changes that have taken place within the Ministry – and the new agenda that it is 
advocating – should not be romanticised or idealised.  Shifting from the rhetoric to the 
actuality of empowerment will require an abundant supply of resources, political will 
and determination; as will influencing the agenda beyond the Ministry.  Nevertheless, 
it is clear that a new era has dawned. 
 
The change of name and focus of the Ministry was ushered in by Kofifah Indar 
Parawansa, who was elected to parliament as a member of Nadatul Ulama (the party 
of Abdurrahman Wahid) and appointed Minister for Women’s Empowerment and 
head of the National Family Planning Coordination Agency (Badan Koordinasi 
Keluarga Berencana Nasional, BKKBN).  Under the stewardship of Kofifah, the 
Ministry was transformed.  Similarly, the aims and approach of the National Family 
Planning Coordination Agency changed markedly, as issues of quality, choice and 
empowerment were given prominence over reduction in the number of births. 
 
Both Megawati and Kofifah demonstrate the potential for women to take of the 
mantle of political leadership in Indonesia and dramatically influence the policy 
agenda.  The particular ways in which each has wielded power demonstrate the very 
different agendas that women parliamentarians will have.  Notably, Kofifah was 
replaced as Minister for Women’s Empowerment when Megawati acceded to the 
Presidency.  During her tenure as Minister for Women’s Empowerment, Kofifah 
pursued an agenda that focused specifically and explicitly on the empowerment of 
women and the promotion of gender justice and equity.  While the obstacles to fully 
achieving these goals remain enormous, Kofifah did indeed ‘make a difference’.  
Megawati, too, has made a difference.  The very fact of her presidency placed the 
issue of women’s parliamentary representation on the public agenda and demonstrated 
in the most practical way that political office is not the preserve of men.  Yet 
Megawati did not have a directly positive impact on issues of gender justice and 
equity.  Not unlike other notable female heads of government, Megawati not only 
resists, but appears to reject, a feminist agenda.2 
                                                 
2 Megawati’s performance as President has been criticised not only by feminists concerned about her 
disregard of gender issues, but also by a range of political commentators concerned about what are 
often seen to be questionable policy decisions and an apparent disregard for democratic principles.   
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Kofifah and Megawati can also been seen as individual embodiments of the general 
principal that has been well demonstrated.  Women can and do make a difference 
within parliaments – both individually and en masse.  But the nature of that difference 
is determined by a range of factors, including the opportunities and restrictions 
women parliamentarians face, the degree of support or hostility from parliamentary 
colleagues (both male and female) and their constituencies, their political allegiances, 
and their personal ideologies and belief systems.  Female parliamentarians, like their 
male counterparts, pursue a range of agendas and bring a range of qualities – both 
positive and negative – to parliament.  Unlike their male counterparts, however, 
female parliamentarians are conspicuous by their low numbers.   
 
Concluding Comments 
As the foregoing discussion indicates, women have actively engaged with democracy 
throughout Indonesia’s history.  This is evident in the campaigns of the women’s 
movement prior to independence, in women’s involvement in the Constitutional 
debates of the 1950s, in the numbers of women that voted in the 1955 and 1999 
elections, and in the role of women’s non-government organisations in the protests 
that lead to the fall of Suharto and since 1998.  Historically, women’s groups have 
also sought to influence the policy agenda and have has some success in doing so.  
This is apparent during the Constitutional Debates of the 1950s and in relation to 
marriage laws.  Yet this success has been limited and largely from outside parliament.  
The small number of women within parliament during the New Order period had 
extremely limited space to influence the policy agenda within the authoritarian 
political environment that prevailed.  However, the same could be said for men.  
While the ruling elite in New Order Indonesia was both largely male and heavily 
masculinist, neither women nor men outside this elite were able to exert significant 
influence over the parliamentary agenda.  With the fall of Suharto and the subsequent 
political transition, women have openly agitated for representation within the formal 
processes of decision-making, and a very small number – including Megawati 
Sukarnoputri and Kofifah Indar Parawansa – have successfully taken up the mantle of 
political power.  For the most part, however, political transition has not opened up 
greater space for women to share in the formal political life of the nation.  Indeed, in 
some districts the space for women to engage in parliament appears to have been 
closed down in recent years. 
 
The obstacles to Indonesian women entering parliament arise from a combination of 
historical legacy, a particular interpretation of Islam, the patriarchal ideology fostered 
by the New Order regime, gendered stereotypes, and political self-interest on the part 
of some male power brokers.  Political transition has not wrought immediate benefits 
for women in terms of parliamentary representation, while decentralisation appears to 
be creating new barriers for women.  In the new political environment, women’s 
groups are adopting and lobbying for a range of strategies to increase the numbers of 
women in parliament.  The demand for greater representation of women in both 
national and local parliaments is now on the political agenda.  The path towards a 
greater – let alone equal – share in power for Indonesian women looks set to be a long 
and difficult one.  It is a path being pursued by women and men who envisage a 
genuinely representative and equitable political system for their nation, and consider 
that such a system can only exist when women gain an equal share in the formal 
processes of decision-making. 
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